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Abstract: Groningen gas field is the largest on-land gas resource in the world and is being 
exploited since 1963. There are damaging earthquakes, the largest of which was 3.6 magnitude. 
The recursive induced earthquakes are often blamed for triggering the structural damages in 
thousands of houses in the area. A damage claim procedure takes place after each significantly 
felt earthquake. The liability of the exploiting company is related to the damages and the 
engineering firms and experts are asked to correlate the claimed damages with a past 
earthquake. Structures in the region present high vulnerabilities to the lateral forces, soil 
properties are quite unfavourable for seismic resistance, and structural damages are present 
even without earthquakes. This situation creates a dispute area where one can claim that most 
structures in the region were already damaged because of the fact that the soil is soft, the ground 
water table oscillates, and structures are vulnerable to external conditions anyhow and deteriorate 
in time, which can be the main cause of such structural damages. This ambiguity of damage vs 
earthquake correlation is one of the main sources of the public unrest in the area up until today. 
This study presents the perspective of people in the region in terms of liveability and the social 
acceptance of earthquakes in their lives. An attempt has been made to translate these social 
effects and expectations into structural performance metrics for ordinary houses in the region. A 
new seismic design and assessment approach, called Comfort Level Earthquake (CLE) has been 
proposed.  
Introduction to the Groningen Case 
Groningen Gas Field was discovered in 1959 and the gas production started in 1963. It is a giant 
energy source; the largest on-land gas field in the world. The estimated reserve is about 2800BcM 
while approximately 2200BcM has already been extracted as of end-2018. The field is operated 
by Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), that is a half-half joint venture of Royal Dutch Shell 
and Exxon Mobil on behalf of “Maatschap Groningen”, which is a partnership of NAM (60%) and 
Energie Beheer Nederland (EBN). EBN is owned by the Dutch state while managing personnel 
of NAM is provided by Shell. 
The Groningen gas is trapped in Rotliegend Sandstone with an initial pressure of 350bar. This 
pressure, after years of production, decreased to the level of 60bar. The reservoir is at 3km depth, 
thus the weight on top of it compacts the whole gas field as the reservoir pressures decreases. 
This compaction varies within the gas field but so far has reached up to 40 to 50cm in the heart 
of the field. There are approximately 2500 faults in the gas field that are time to time activated 
due to the huge pressure on top and differences of pressure (Bommer et al., 2018), causing 
shallow small-magnitude earthquakes.  
The tectonic structure of the gas field was silent until 1991. Questions arose following the first 
registered earthquake in another relatively small gas field in Assen, south of Groningen. The NAM 
headquarters are also in the same city. The first earthquake in the Groningen field was registered 
by KNMI (Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute) in 1991. Despite the resistance and denial by the 
licensee company (NAM) until 1993, a study by KNMI and SoDM (the regulatory body – State 
Supervision of Mines) exhibited a relationship between the by-then-smaller earthquakes and the 
gas production operation (KNMI, 1992). In the awake of the potential of hazard, KNMI further 
investigated the case and came up with an expected maximum earthquake magnitude of ML3.3. 
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Basic Gutenberg-Richter recurrence formula was employed in their analyses, which is pretty 
much valid for stationary fault activities of natural tectonic earthquakes. Induced earthquakes, 
however, as further studies have shown in the following years, largely depend on the production 
rate. In other words, even if the production keeps a constant pace, an ever-increasing subsidence 
and compaction would translate into increase in magnitude and frequency of earthquakes. 
Realizing this fact, KNMI has further increased the expected maximum magnitude to ML3.9 in 
2006 (van Eck et al., 2006), 6 years before the Huizinge event of 2012 with magnitude ML3.6 
already.   
Most of the arrangements and research focused on soil subsidence. Due to the impact of 
subsidence on surface water management, that is an important issue in an agricultural region, an 
agreement was made between NAM and the Province Groningen in 1983 for monitoring and 
managing the water level. Until 2012, focus was the soil subsidence (Gussinklo et al., 2001), not 
the earthquakes. 
Although the first signs were clear, at least looking at the past, neither NAM nor SoDM had 
conducted further research to understand the possible extend of the problem, uncertainties 
associated or the levels of risk as function of the production rates. That was the case until 2012. 
The history of earthquake engineering is filled with “black swans” (Taleb, 2010), that are the 
events which fit in the definition of “highly improbable”. Although smaller than the expected 
maximum magnitude defined by KNMI 6 years ago, in a region that has never experienced such 
an event the black swan of Groningen was the 2012 Huizinge event. The earthquake took place 
in August, with a magnitude of ML3.6. KNMI, by then, had 6 accelerometer stations close-by, the 
closest of which recorded 0.08g PGA in horizontal direction. More than 2000 damage claims were 
filed, 80% of which are estimated to be related to the event (NAM, 2016).There were two striking 
outcomes from this event: i) larger magnitude earthquakes are possible, ii) earthquakes in the 
gas field have potential to cause structural damage and eventually losses of life.  
In most active tectonic regions of the world, earthquakes close to magnitude 3.6 happen every 
week, if not every day. Such earthquakes are not even recorded in the archives. That is one 
misleading fact which, for earthquake researchers and engineers who are not familiar with all 
angles of the Groningen issue, leads to serious underestimation of the facts. There are three 
arguments which dictate to take the seismic activity in Groningen more serious: 
1. the soil is weak, with close-to-surface ground water table  
2. local construction practice renders structures extremely vulnerable to earthquakes 
3. induced earthquakes are liability cases, lowering thus the tolerance of people to 
earthquake-related damages 
Despite the shocking event of 2012, the gas production hit the history-highest in 2013 with 54BcM 
that year. Report by Dutch Safety Board (Dutch Safety Board, 2014) and the decision of Council 
of State (Raad van State, 2015) forced the Dutch government to gradually decrease the 
production. The annual production thus decreased to 42.5BcM in 2014, 24Bcm in 2016, and was 
at the level of 19.4BcM in 2018-2019 period.  
The denial narrative of NAM until 1993, and the underestimation of the issue even after the 2012 
Huizinge event, eroded the trust amongst locals, which traditionally already feel neglected by the 
central government residing in The Hague in the western part of the Netherlands. Their feelings 
were not unjust, considering that in the period 1995-2009 the investments from the Dutch 
Infrastructure Fund – FES, which received 40% of the Groningen gas income, went to the 
Randstad area (Amsterdam-The Hauge-Rotterdam) and only 1% was spent for the three northern 
provinces, including but not limited to Groningen.  
Although an extensive effort has been made by NAM, resulting in world-class research on finally 
determining the risk with all its fronts, it was too late for social acceptance. Especially the lack of 
local technical institutions that can focus on seismic risk and structural damages, that can produce 
counter arguments to those of NAM, and can be appreciated as independent at the same time, 
helped in generating an “alternative public science” (Sintubin, 2018). The lack of technical 
expertise in earthquake engineering, and the strategy of national experts in adapting existing non-
seismic knowledge to earthquake engineering discipline while closing eyes and ears to what was 
readily available, fuelled this alternative public science, creating an augmented reality, a parallel 
Dutch treatment of earthquakes, often ending with the poisonous conclusion of “Groningen 
earthquakes are different!” (Bal, 2018).  
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A series of recent developments changed the course of the Groningen issue over the last 4 years. 
In 2015, the Dutch government expanded the application of the Meijdam norm to Groningen. This 
is a norm defining a risk of death for an individual from external causes such as flooding. That 
practically meant that the risk of dying from earthquake in Groningen should be limited to 1 in 
100,000 annually. A lower level of 1 in 10,000 per year is also allowed provided that the risk will 
be reduced to the norm within 5 years. In 2016, the Dutch mining law was changed shifting the 
“burden of proof” from the claiming body to the licensee, only for Groningen gas field. This resulted 
a boom in damage claims and a drastic increase in engineering expenses of damage claim 
evaluations. In 2018, a court case confirmed that the beneficiary of the field should pay the losses 
in the house real estate value, and at the time which the house owner will decide (not necessarily 
at the time of selling). In the last couple of months, NAM has also lost symbolic cases concerning 
farmhouses in which large compensations were claimed. 
Rapid decrease in the production of gas until 2018 and the fact that the magnitude of earthquakes 
until then was relatively small as compared to that of Huizinge, led to the impression that the 
earthquake problem was finally under control. An earthquake of ML3.4 close to Zeerijp on the 8th 
of January 2018 was enough to bring back the feeling of insecurity. The maximum PGA recorded 
during the Zeerijp Earthquake was 0.11g, higher than that of the Huizinge event in 2012, and 
slightly above the limit of 0.10g of the traffic light scheme of SoDM, activating different protocols. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs immediately ordered further reduction in gas production to 
12BcM. In the following months, the Minister announced that the gas production in Groningen 
would stop by 2030, however this could also be as early as 2025. 
Distrust, lack of technical expertise of earthquake engineering in the area and even in the country, 
ever-changing hazard maps, banning of the European structural code for seismic design 
(Eurocode 8) and replacing it with a nationally-made code that has also been ever-changing, 
retrofitting decisions that contradict each other even in neighbouring houses, and finally, the 
struggle for compensation affecting people living in damaged houses, lead to a loss of the social 
license to operate (SLO) for the companies exploiting the Groningen Gas Field. A conscientious 
article focussing on developments leading up to this loss of the SLO, which inspired part of the 
introduction here as well, is written by van den Beukel and van Geuns (2019). 
Situation in Groningen in Damage Claims 
Due to the liability structure of induced seismicity, people are entitled to claim damages after an 
earthquake. This claim procedure has been cumbersome since the beginning in 2012 being 
subject to several changes on the way. 
Handling of Damage Claims so far 
From 1991 up until now, Groningen has been hit by more than 1,300 induced earthquakes. One 
of the issues that keep the tension alive is the damage claims after earthquakes. The tension gets 
higher as new earthquakes occur, new damage claims are filed and the backlog on responding 
to these claims gets deeper, creating a vicious cycle. There are approximately 100,000 claims 
filed since the Huizinge event in 2012. Although it is a clear conflict of interest, and as part of the 
mismanagement of the Groningen case, the claims were handled directly by NAM at the 
beginning. NAM had handled 80,982 claims until June 2017, paying 1.172b€ compensation (NU, 
2018; Mulder and Perey, 2018), 64% of which was paid by the state. There are still 650 cases 
awaiting decision from NAM.  
In 2015, a new organization was assigned for handling the strengthening program as well as the 
damage claim: Centrum Veilig Wonen (CVW, Center for Safe Living). Although it raised questions 
due to its association with NAM, CVW had been handling the damage claims until March 2017. 
The National Coordinator Groningen (another new institution by then, created for handling the 
earthquake issue in Groningen on behalf of central and local administration), ordered CVW to 
keep collecting damage claim files but stop evaluating them. In January 2018, shortly after the 
Zeerijp Earthquake, the Minister decided that the damage claims would be evaluated by a 
temporary committee on behalf of the central government: Tijdelijke Commissie Mijnbouwschade 
Groningen (TCMG, Technical Committee of Mining Damages Groningen). TCMG, in doing so yet 
another institution was created from scratch to handle the damage cases, received 13,500 
damage claim files from CVW. There are still 16,000 claims lying on the shelves of TCMG waiting 
for a decision. While this number does not include damage reported after the recent event on the 
22nd of May.  
 BAL et al. 
4 
A recent earthquake of ML3.4 was recorded near Westerwijtwerd on the 22nd of May 2019, early 
in the morning. The earthquake generated a maximum PGA of 0.03g, lower than what would be 
expected for its magnitude. The difference this time was that the earthquake was relatively closer 
to the centre of Groningen city, resulting thus that half of the 2,000 damage claims were reported 
from the city.  
Technical Background 
The “gas extraction-earthquake-damage-claim-compensation” cycle in Groningen given in Figure 
1 has issues from a technical point of view. This is a legal liability case, but the proof is expected 
from technical people. The required proof however does not fit to the earthquake engineering 
perspective. The very reason for this is the ambiguous relationship between small recursive 
earthquakes and visible structural cracks. A clear relationship is further hindered by the particular 
soil and structural properties in the Groningen region.  
 
Figure 1. The earthquake cycle in Groningen. 
One can claim that most structures in the earthquake region were already damaged because the 
soil is weak, the ground water table oscillates, and structures are vulnerable to external conditions 
anyhow and deteriorate in time. This would indeed not be a wrong proposition. The other side of 
the coin, however, is that the quite small and recursive earthquakes can cause serious damages 
on structures, not because of the direct loading on the load bearing system but due to the 
interaction between the soft soil and the structure. Most structures in the region are masonry, a 
brittle material that cannot compensate even slight foundation movements. In this case, recursive 
earthquakes can easily move the soil, imposing support settlement to the structural bearing 
system that can take place even after the earthquake. This would cause damages that look like 
triggered by soil movement, but the question whether these cracks are really caused by the soil 
settlement or by the earthquakes remains. Confirming or excluding one or the other causes can 
be quite complicated and cumbersome, if not pointless, in terms of engineering work, time and 
money.  
One good example to show the difficulty of this task is the work by Dais et al., 2018. The study 
focuses on Fraeylemaborg, a noble house in the earthquake region from the 13th century. The 
monument experienced serious damages in recent earthquakes and was repaired twice in 2015. 
Detailed structural computer simulations did not explain why these damages had occurred as the 
estimated accelerations were too low to create structural damage. After scrutinized work and with 
the help of an extensive real-time monitoring system on the building, a damage scenario was 
built. Comparison of this scenario with real damages is shown in Figure 2. According to that, the 
mostly-damaged North-West wing of the structure must have lost support in order to trigger the 
cracks observed on that part of the structure. This loss of support can only occur if the masonry 
retaining structure, together with the foundations, moved forcing the load bearing walls to follow 
in a mostly lateral direction. There are signs around the structure supporting this scenario. In this 
case, the observed cracks may seem soil-related to a technical person who does not know the 
earthquake history of Fraeylemaborg. However, the soil movement is most probably related to 
the earthquakes. This is collateral damage that is extremely difficult to prove, and yet the 
presented scenario remains just a scenario even after the detailed work. 
Surprisingly, additional cracks on the walls were observed in the summer of 2018, although there 
had no significant earthquake occurred at that time. Further investigation revealed that an 
earthquake of the magnitude ML1.9 had occurred 15km distant to Fraeylemaborg. The 
accelerometer network in the structure recorded the motion but only very weak amplitudes, 
0.001g at the base and 0.006g on the tower were recorded as maximum values. The earthquake 
motion, by any means, was far from creating a structural damage. When the tiltmeter installed at 
the basement (on a foundation wall) was further investigated, a very slow process was discovered 
(Figure 3).  Considering the speed of the movement and the fact that the summer of 2018 was 
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extremely dry, this movement could well be related to the ground water, that might have been 
moving caused by the very small distant earthquake. The point here is that, such a slow 
movement that takes progress of 5 days after the earthquake, in parallel to the very small and 
rather insignificant accelerations recorded on the structure and at the base, could lead to an 
engineering decision that the damages observed a couple of days after the event are not related 
to the earthquake.  
 
Figure 2. Fraeylemaborg in Slochteren, (a) The real crack pattern observed in North-West wing 
of the structure, (b) the response of the same wall for the seismic scenario simulated in the 
computer with maximum principal stresses in kPa (c) the response of the entire structure for the 




Figure 3. Tiltmeter data, 15 days before and after an earthquake in Appingedam, magnitude 
ML1.9, on 8th of August 2018 (courtesy of StabiAlert). 
In short, even with education and some level of experience in earthquake engineering, most 
engineers would not be able to clearly connect or disconnect visible structural cracks in Groningen 
houses with the earthquakes that have not exceeded ML 3.6 so far. Cracks would be much more 
pronounced if the earthquakes occurred in larger magnitudes, because then the identification of 
cracks caused by earthquakes would be a much easier job. In the existing situation of small 
 
Figure 8. Tiltmeter data from the base of Fraeylemaborg, 15 days before and after the 08-08-




3. S mmary of Conclusions 
Conclusion from the monitoring activities so far are summarized below: 
 
- Even small and distant earthquakes affect the structure 
 
- The effect of the small and distant earthquakes do not manifest themselves 
immediately, but a damage procedure takes place in approximately 5 days following 
the earthquake 
 
- Soil and the structure run into higher stress values the days following the earthquake, 
limiting the daily fluctuations of movements and eventually resulting residual damage 
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magnitude earthquakes, one can always have “opinion and speculations”, but not “proof”. There 
is, however, a great gap between a personal and rather subjective opinion and technically sound 
conclusions to create base for a financial claim or to decline such a claim. This is reason why a 
different approach is proposed here for responding to damage claims. 
CLE – Comfort Level Earthquake 
The earthquake engineering was subject to a paradigm shift after 1994 Northridge Earthquake 
which caused no life losses but an extensive financial loss (Kathleen and Dahlhamer, 1997). Until 
then the seismic design codes imposed a single option where the life safety was the prime limit 
while financial losses were omitted. “Vision 2000” document (OES, 1995), that is the Magna Carta 
of the modern earthquake engineering design philosophy, proposed a performance-based design 
where various seismic performance levels could be selected by the owner. A probabilistic 
approach was needed for the purposes of this proposal. Seismic hazard assessment with varying 
probabilities of exceedances are used to fill in the demand side of the problem. In the following 
years, different earthquake levels were defined for varying performance requests. 4 of those 
levels remained as the main pillars of the performance-based earthquake engineering. Due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of the paper, it is necessary to explain these 4 levels in summary for the 
non-technical reader. These earthquakes are defined by probability of exceedance in a number 
of year or with a return period. 
The first level is the SLE – Serviceability Level Earthquake. That is pretty much the same in 
European seismic norm Eurocode 8 and it corresponds to a level of earthquake at which structural 
damage is not expected and a slight damage to non-structural components may be possible. This 
is the level where 10% probability of exceedance is expected in 10 years, translating into 95 years 
return period. 
The second level is the DBE – Design Basis Earthquake. This is the level that defines the seismic 
design of ordinary structures with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, translating into 475 
years return period. Structures are expected to undergo moderate but repairable damage during 
such earthquakes. 
The third level is UBE – Upper Bound Earthquake. This is a second line of defence that is 
sometimes needed in special structures. This earthquake level corresponds to 5% probability of 
exceedance in 50 years, translating into 975 years return period. 
The final level is MCE – Maximum Credible Earthquake. MCE-level earthquakes are very rare but 
very large events with serious extended damage and possible collapses in old building stock. This 
is the red-line type of seismic design level at which even important structures, such as hospitals 
or fire brigade structures are expected to undergo moderate damage. No structure is supposed 
to collapse at this level of earthquake, but most of the ordinary buildings will be unusable. 
The CLE, Comfort Level Earthquake proposed in this paper, is based on several assumptions, 
which, of course, need to be investigated in terms of social acceptance. First of fall, the 30-year 
period of a regular house mortgage in the Netherlands is used as a base. The reason for this is 
that people are able to make life plans for a 30-year period, as they do when buying a new house. 
Furthermore, the number of exceedances is assumed 2 here. The practical meaning of 2 is that, 
in a 30-year “foreseeable” period, there may be several earthquakes, but the two largest ones will 
be considered as significant. In other words, the seismic hazard model with 30/2=15 years return 
period will provide the expected earthquake level.  
The centre of Loppersum, that is pretty much the heart of the earthquake region in Groningen gas 
field, is used here to demonstrate an example. The KNMI/NEN seismic hazard map is used to 
find the acceleration spectra for 95, 475, 975 and 2475 year return periods. These numbers were 
extracted from a continuous line of annual probability of exceedance by KNMI when the seismic 
hazard map is prepared, but the authors do not have access to those annual probability curves. 
Instead, and only for the sake of demonstration, the 4 points of the annual probability curve (4 
return periods) are used to reconstruct the curve and then extrapolate it to 15 years return period. 
This operation resulted the plots in Figure 4. The extrapolation gives spectral acceleration 
demands for the case of 15 years return period, or in other words, 6.5% annual probability of 
exceedance. 
In order to run this demonstration, 3 different building typologies are used. These building 
typologies are extensively used in Groningen hazard and risk models (Crowley et al., 2019) and 
are given below in Table 1. The fundamental periods are assumed 0.25sec, 0.08sec and 0.4sec 
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for URM3L, URM7L and URM2L typologies, respectively (Crowley et al., 2019). These 
fundamental periods are then used for finding structure-specific seismic demand on the building. 
The annual hazard curves in Figure 4 are generated by using the spectral demands at these 
fundamental periods. 




URM3L URM wall-slab-wall (i.e. terraced-style) with cavity walls 
and concrete floors, low-rise 
46,143 0.055g 
URM7L URM wall – wall with cavity walls and concrete floors 
low-rise 
14,633 0.030g 
URM2L URM wall – slab – wall with solid walls and timber floors 
low rise 
7,862 0.035g 
Table 1. Building typologies used in demonstration (by Crowley et al., 2019) 
After defining the CLE spectral acceleration levels, as shown in Table 1, all past earthquakes with 
magnitude equal to or larger than ML2.0 were examined. There are 29 earthquakes since 2012 
fitting that description. The strong ground motion station of KNMI with the code BLOP (B-station 
in Loppersum) is used for this purpose and the acceleration records from all these 29 events are 
used (BLOP did not exist during 2012 Huizinge event, thus the results of a close-by station in 
Stedum are used). 5% damped acceleration spectra are produced and the Sa(T1), the spectral 
acceleration demand at the T1 fundamental period for each of the three building types are 
calculated. When compared to the CLE spectral acceleration levels, plots in Figure 5 are 
obtained. In the last 8 years period with the highest but dropping production rates, the CLE level 
of 15 years return period (2 events in 30-year time) are exceeded once in URM3L and in URM2L, 
and twice in URM7L.  
    
 
Figure 4. Annual hazard curves and assumed extrapolations for building typologies URM2L 
(top-left), URM3L (top-right), and URM7L (bottom). 
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Proposed Compensation Scheme and the use of CLE 
Due to the inherent difficulties of correlating damages with small recursive seismic events, as 
explained above, a compensation scheme is proposed here in combination with the CLE 
earthquake risk level. According to this, a risk-based (not hazard-based) annual compensation 
per-house should be defined by the government. This compensation may have an index value of 
100 in Loppersum, at the heart of the gas field, and go down to zero outside of the buffer zone of 
the risk map. The idea is that, when people receive this unconditional (i.e. not related to damage) 
support, they will be given two options. Option 1: An annual, unconditional, risk-based financial 
compensation, and right to file a claim after every earthquake, as happens today; Option 2: A 
higher annual compensation than that of Option 1, and right to claim damages only if the 
earthquake exceeds the pre-defined CLE level at the exact location of the building. Option 2 may 
also have sub-options such as 1, 2- or 3-times exceedance of a certain earthquake level in 30 
years, instead of 2 times that is used in the example here, which will all have different influences 
on the annual compensation amount.   
Prerequisites for Applying the Proposed Scheme 
The proposed scheme requires a well-maintained, world-class strong ground motion monitoring 
network in operation. The household network of NAM has 400+ accelerometer sensors at the 
moment, installed according to the Dutch SBR guidelines (SBR, 2017), but the collected data is 
not usable for earthquake engineering purposes for multiple reasons (Bal, 2018).  
A zero-state recording is needed for every single house in the stock. This does not necessarily 
mean a costly engineering work, but it may also well be simple photographs of all the walls and 
connections of a house. Even a simple app can be used for this purpose from which photographs 
are collected by the house owners and uploaded to a central server with geo-codes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Elastic spectral acceleration demands for all earthquakes above magnitude ML2.0 and 
comparison with the CLE spectral acceleration limits for building typologies URM2L (top-left), 
URM3L (top-right) and URM7L (bottom) - please note that the red dots show the earthquakes 
that would exceed the CLE level earthquake limit in the last y years, since 2012 Huizinge event. 
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As another prerequisite , a comprehensive risk study is needed. As part of that, a typology has to 
be assigned to every single building in the stock. 
Furthermore, benchmark buildings with the most representative typologies should be selected 
from the core and from the periphery of the gas field, and they should be properly monitored for 
seismic action, similar to the monitoring conducted at Fraeylemaborg (Bal, 2019). 
Last but not the least, a white page needs to be opened with the remaining damage claims by 
NAM and by TCMG before moving to a new era. 
Conclusions 
Groningen gas field is a giant hydrocarbon energy source that is being exploited since 1961. 
Earthquakes are recorded since 1991, with the largest in 2012 with a magnitude of ML3.6. 100,000 
damage claims have been filed out since then. Approximately 81,000 have been handled by NAM, 
while 650 cases are still unresolved. After consecutive changes in the handling institutions, 
another 18,000 files concerning actual damage are still waiting on the shelves. A general 
mismanagement of the earthquake issue, as explained in detail in this paper, resulted in a loss of 
the social license to operate (SLO). One of the major inducements in that was the handling of 
damage claims, a problem that has not been solved up until now.  
This paper proposes a paradigm shift in handling the claims. The damage handling scheme 
proposed here contains an unconditional risk-based compensation scheme. On top of that, a 
different earthquake level is proposed; CLE – Comfort Level Earthquake, at the exceedance of 
which the building owners will be entitled to further claim damages. The proposed approach may 
ease the handling of the damages in the Groningen gas field until (and possibly after) the gas 
production is ended and as such reduce social tension in the region.    
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